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Health Care through the ‘Lens of Risk’: Reflections of the four special issues 
of Health, Risk & Society  
 
Bob Heyman 
 
Health Sciences, University of Huddersfield, Huddersfield, UK 
 
Abstract 
 
This editorial reviews the four special issues of Health, Risk & Society on Health 
Care Through the ‘Lens of Risk’ guest-edited by Bob Heyman, Andy Alaszewski and 
Patrick Brown in 2012-2013 which marked the twentieth anniversary of the 
publication of the Royal Society Risk report in 1992. In these Issues we showed how 
the objectivist definition of risk in this monograph as ‘the probability that a particular 
adverse event occurs during a stated period of time, or results from a particular 
challenge’ could be fruitfully reframed from an interpretivist standpoint. From this 
perspective, events are considered to derive variably from categorisation, adversity 
from negative valuing, probabilities from uncertain expectations, and stated periods 
of time from time-framing. In the editorial, I provide an overview of 23 research 
papers published in the special issues with references to the potential of interpretivist 
approaches to the social science of risk, and offer reflections on the strengths and 
limitations of this paradigm. 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the last two years, Andy Alaszewski, Patrick Brown and I have guest-edited a 
special issue series of Health, Risk & Society entitled Health Care Through the ‘Lens 
of Risk’, using the 20th anniversary of the Royal Society (1992) Risk monograph as 
the starting point. The four linked issues were organised around the definition of risk 
in this monograph as ‘the probability that a particular adverse event occurs during a 
stated period of time, or results from a particular challenge’ (p. 2). Each issue 
challenged the report’s attempt to establish the foundations for a science of 
quantitative risk assessment through an interpretivist reframing of one of the four 
components which the definition refers to, building on  Heyman, Shaw Alaszewski 
and Titterton’s critique of the objectivist approach to risk (2010, pp.20-21).  
 
In terms of this critique, ‘events’ cannot be identified without categorisation which 
lumps together selected diverse phenomena into perceived equivalence, 
differentiating them from ‘the rest’. Perceptions that events are ‘adverse’ entail value 
judgements. Probabilities derive from a variety of methods for constructing uncertain 
expectations. Even if they are based on inductive evidence, multiple probabilities of 
the same event can be reasonably calculated, depending upon the observer’s 
knowledge and choices from available information. Periods of time cannot be ‘stated’ 
unless the observer has framed time in a particular way. (The alternate ‘results from 
a particular challenge’ in the Royal Society definition appears to set an indefinite 
temporal horizon for risk assessment. It inadvertently precludes the advocated 
quantification of risks since consequence chains can in principle extend to infinity.) 
From an interpretivist stance, risks cannot ‘exist’ independently of observers. In 
nature, unique individual events merely happen. The construction of risks as 
objective entities requires tacit socio-culturally mediated projections of judgements 
onto events, as in the conversion of negatively valuing into the attribute of adversity.  
 
Critical social scientists, including the contributors to these special issues, seek to 
unravel such projections. Bog-standard interpretive social science can be used to 
challenge prevailing forms of risk governmentality which rely on attempted 
suppression of debates about potentially controversial issues. The contested risk 
issues explored in this series from interpretive perspectives include the health effects 
of electromagnetic radiation, normal birthing, older parenting, illicit drug use, alcohol 
consumption, self-harming, patient non-compliance, the rehabilitation of offenders, 
child protection, public health, delay in cancer self-referral and being a young person 
not in education, employment or training (a NEET). As well as contributing to 
literatures on these topics from risk social science perspectives, the assembling of 
papers on risk categorisation, valuing, uncertain expecting and time-framing allows 
common features to be identified across ranges of diverse social contexts, as briefly 
documented in the next-but-one section. 
 
My fellow guest editors have kindly granted me the last word on the special issue 
series. The brief comments which follow are organised into three parts: firstly, some 
remarks about the origins and current significance of the Royal Society Risk 
monograph; secondly, a  retrospective overview of the four special issues; and, 
thirdly, some wider reflectionsi about the strengths and limitations of interpretivist 
approaches to the social science of health risk. I would like to particularly thank 
Patrick Brown for unfailing support, sharp critical comments and unearthing 
promising authors; and Andy Alaszewski for supporting this experiment in his journal 
which combines a clear but broad focus on the social science of health risk with 
flexibility in relation to paper length and form. 
 
The Royal Society 1992 Risk monograph 20 years on  
 
Although acknowledging social scientific challenges to the objectification of risk even 
in the Introduction, the monograph opens on an uncompromisingly quantitative note 
which may seem dated 20 years later, stating (p. 4) that a ‘general concept of risk is 
the chance, in quantitative terms, of a defined hazard occurring. It thereby combines 
a probabilistic measure of the occurrence of the primary event(s) with a measure of 
the consequences of that/those event(s)’. This starting-point was challenged in a 
later part of the Risk monograph itself. Pidgeon, the lead author of the chapter on 
risk perception, and Horlick-Jones, an author of the following chapter on risk 
management were interviewed for this special issue series (Heyman and Brown, 
2012; 2013b). In the interviews, they offered detailed insights into the conflicts over 
risk objectivity which resulted in the report not being endorsed as a Royal Society 
approved document having collective rather than individual authorship. In his 
interview, Horlick-Jones tentatively credited Chris Hood, lead author of the second 
social science chapter, with inventing the epithet ‘four chapters good, two chapters 
bad’, a reference to Orwell’s Animal Farm, in response to Royal Society unease 
about the two social science chapters. Horlick-Jones commented that the issue of 
interpretivism versus objectivism not only divides social from natural scientists, but is 
also found within the social sciences. Pidgeon stated that the report may have 
became a best-seller because it engaged with this controversy. He noted that it was 
reappraised by new science policy advisors in the Royal Society four or five years 
later as state-of-the art, and provided the impetus for a subsequent large UK 
government funded Risk and Human Behaviour research programme. 
 
Despite its age, the Risk monograph remains influential, with a current citation factor 
of 65 in the two-year period 2011-2012, or 59 if references in our special issues are 
excluded, and the citations have a global reach. It must be admitted that the main 
driver for our series was not to celebrate the monograph’s 20th anniversary, but to 
contribute to the subversion of the objectivist assumptions underlying the 
exceptionally clear definition of risk, quoted above, which was its starting point.   
 
The ‘Lens of Risk’ special issue series 
 
The first of the four special issues, on the categorisation of health risks, was 
published in April 2012, and the last, a double issue on risk, health and time 
appeared in November 2013. The first call for papers went out in 2010 and the 
project took about double the initially anticipated length of time to complete. A total of 
23 substantive research or review papers were published, plus accounts of 
interviews with 8 significant contributors to risk social science (Nick Pidgeon, Joost 
Van Loon, Ortwin Renn, Judith Green, Peter Taylor-Gooby, Tom Horlick-Jones, Paul 
Slovic and Andy Alaszewski)ii and 7 editorials. The combined length of the special 
issues and annexes is over 600 pages, considerably in excess of most academic 
books. The special issue series offers a distinctive but little used genre, more flexible 
than an edited book, and with a publication time-spread which allows the authors of 
later papers to draw on those already published.  
 
Of the 23 substantive papers published in the series, 16 derived from fieldwork 
undertaken in the UK, 4 from continental Europe, and 2 from North America. The 
international contributions were most welcome. The UK predominance among the 
papers located in rich countries perhaps reflects the strength of the critical risk social 
science in this country, to which the Risk monograph contributed, as well as the 
propensity for authors to submit to their national journals. Only one paperiii, a 
powerful analysis of the tension between medical and traditional categorisations of 
malaria/nzoka in rural Tanzania (Desmond, Prost and Wight, 2012) considered risk 
outside the developed world. This narrowness of remit may result, at least to some 
extent, from the status of societally organised risk consciousness as a luxury item. 
 
Just two of the 23 substantive papers drew in whole or in part on quantitative 
methods (Kayali and Iqbal, 2012; Young, King, Harper and Humphreys, 2013), a 
pattern which reflects the overall preference for qualitative methods in current 
interpretive social science. But the papers demonstrate the potential for quantifying 
risk perceptions, as against objectified risks which have been divorced from their 
observers. This distinction is well-illustrated by the work of Kayali and Iqbal (2012) 
who dichotomised women’s accounts of depression into those which did and did not 
identify any external triggers, regardless of their ‘reasonableness’. For example, one 
research participant believed that the 9/11 attack on the New York Trade Centre had 
triggered a depression episode even though she had no personal connections with 
anyone who had been directly affected. The authors concluded that about half their 
sample could and could not, identify external triggers, and that identifying a trigger 
was strongly associated with believing that their depression was not permanent. This 
intuitively plausible finding would hold true even if it was not born out by 
retrospectively observed outcomes. 
 
The structure of the special issue series separated out categorisation, valuing, 
uncertain expecting and time-framing for analytical purposes. However, these four 
ingredients of the risk compound are interrelated. For example, lengthening or 
shortening the temporal horizon within which risked consequences such as cancer 
recurrence will be considered increases or decreases their observed frequency of 
occurrence. Authors were invited to foreground the topic under consideration but to 
relate their analysis to the other three highlighted concerns as appropriate. The 
assignment of papers to a particular issue could be somewhat arbitrary. One article 
was hastily reoriented so that it could be published in the time special issue because 
the writers had missed the earlier deadline for papers on risk categorisation! The 
same project, investigating the accounts of their actions given by people who self-
harm, was drawn on in relation to both the value (Barton-Breck and Heyman, 2012) 
and time-framing (West, Newton and Barton-Breck, 2013) issues. 
 
Compilation illustrates the range of risk-related topics which the adopted structure 
encompassed. With respect, firstly, to construction of risked ‘events’ through socially 
mediated but largely tacit processes of categorisation, papers were published on: the 
struggles of self-defined electro-hypersensitivity sufferers to obtain official 
recognition (De Graff and Bröer, 2012); combined usage of malaria and nzoka as 
disease categories in rural Africa (Desmond Prost and Wight, 2012); delineating 
subcategories of depression experientially (Kayali and Iqbal, 2012); how older 
women understand the nature of a disease, osteoporosis, the existence of which 
arises from marking an arbitrary cut-off on a continuous measure, bone-density 
(Skolbekken, Østerlie and Forsmo, 2012); and midwives’ understandings about the 
ever-narrowing status of low-risk, ‘normal’ pregnancy (Scammell and Alaszewski, 
2012). The last paper is of particular interest because it tracks a process of second-
order abstraction whereby higher relative risk becomes a clinical entity in itself.  
 
A key theme in these articles is tension between personal and medical 
categorisations of health issues. It is tempting to compare the struggle for recognition 
of electro-hypersensitivity depicted by De Graff and Bröer with the efforts of the 
pharmaceutical industry to establish a taken-for-granted existence, and thereby a 
lucrative market, for conditions such as child attention/deficit hyperactivity disorder 
which the public may struggle to differentiate from traditional naughtiness (Clarke, 
2011). The immanence of CADD/CADHD is sanctified by the claims of science. This 
supposed disease has spawned an extensive literature on supposed genetic, 
neurological and, more rarely, social-interactional causes which leaves its existence 
as an objective entity unquestioned. In contrast, self-defined electro-hypersensitivity 
sufferers are readily dismissed as cranks, although De Graff and Bröer observed that 
the Dutch government was willing to recognise this condition as psychologically real. 
Whether this type of state indulgence will survive in the economic aftermath of the 
2007 financial crash remains to be seen. 
 
In relation, secondly, to the often taken-for-granted negative value judgements 
through which adversity is projected onto ‘event’ categories, giving them an aura of 
intrinsic ‘adversity’, the published papers covered: recreational heroin and cocaine 
consumer perspectives on safe and risky usage (Caiata-Zufferey, 2012); the benefits 
and costs of non-injurious self-harming (Barton-Breck and Heyman, 2012); the 
prioritisation of protecting the public versus reintegration into the community as 
viewed by discharged forensic mental health service users (Coffey, 2012); a case 
study of a woman whose action choice put her recovery from anal cancer at serious 
risk (Heyman, McGrath, Nastro, Lunniss and Davies, 2012); and the value 
judgements made by pregnant teenagers about their condition (Hoggart, 2012). One 
theme runs clearly through this work: that individuals frequently challenge the 
projected medical and societal value judgements which underlie risk-thinking. These 
debates are complicated by culturally reinforced fusions which blur distinctions 
between risk factors and outcomes (Heyman et al., 2010, pp. 45-46). Illicit drug use, 
being a teenage mother and the like are mostly castigated not in themselves, but 
because they are viewed as giving rise to greater probabilities of other negatively 
valued states such as developing physical or mental health problems. Risk factors 
tend to accumulate negativity in their own right, a value judgement which those who 
have made themselves susceptible to them may vigorously challenge. 
 
With regard, thirdly, to the construction of uncertain expectations, the published 
articles were concerned with: the complexities of drawing on probabilistic information 
derived from screening to inform medical decision-making (Austin, Reventlow, 
Sandøe and Brodersen, 2013); the underestimated impact of the hindsight effect on 
retrospective blaming in child protection cases (Kearney, 2013); the unreflectively 
self-fuelling approach through which the accumulation of file-notes in child protection 
cases comes to be viewed as itself a risk indicator (Stanley, 2013); the inductive 
prevention paradox, whereby prophylactic measures erase the inductive evidence 
which might have informed assessment of their utility, in this case for forensic mental 
health service-users being considered for discharge from secure accommodation 
(Heyman, Godin, Reynolds and Davies, 2013); media influences on public 
perceptions about probabilities of disease outbreaks (Young, et al., 2013); 
probabilistic reasoning and the difficulty of delimiting the precautionary principle in 
the pharmaceutical industry (Osimani, 2013); and variations in understandings of 
probabilistic information received during pregnancy screening for chromosomal 
anomalies such as Down’s syndrome (Burton-Jeangros, Cavalli, Gouilhers and 
Hammer, 2013). The papers illustrate the many and varied difficulties and paradoxes 
inherent in the quintessential step in risk-thinking of building expectations about the 
future from probability quantifications. This process generates apparently precise 
numbers which conceal more than they reveal.  
 
With respect, fourthly and finally, to risk, health and time, the guest editors had 
anticipated that this topic would be the trickiest to find material for. However, we 
ended up with sufficient material for a double special issue. The published papers 
covered: home drinking in relation to concerns about the present and future (Foster 
and Heyman, 2013); the decision-making of older women about when to become 
pregnant (Locke and Budds, 2013); constructions of their futures by patients with 
advanced cancer (Brown and De Graaf, 2013); the temporal considerations of 
individuals who self-harm (West, Newton and Barton-Breck, 2013); and accounts of 
their time management given by patients who develop malignant melanoma 
(Topping, Nkosana-Nyawata and Heyman, 2013). The original call for papers 
referred to ‘time-framing’, drawing attention to the propensity of policy-makers, 
healthcare professionals and  public to set temporal horizons beyond which risk 
assessment is not considered, as with the convention of assessing five-year survival 
for cancer treatments. However, this agenda would have excluded consideration of 
variations in understandings of temporality within an operational time frame, such as 
discounting the future at different rates and reappraising timeliness in retrospect. The 
term ‘time-shaping’ might have been more appropriate for drawing attention to a set 
of issues which are seriously neglected in risk social science even though the main 
purpose of the ‘lens of risk’ is to attempt to manage what might come to pass. 
 
The strengths and limitations of  Interpretivist approaches to risk  
 
The third and final part of this article will outline in editorial declarative style some 
reflections about the strengths and limitations of interpretive social science 
approaches to health risks. The hoary age of theoretical frameworks such as 
symbolic interactionism (Mead, 1934; Blumer, 1969) exposes those of us who 
continue to use them to the charge of being behind-the-times. However, the ongoing 
value of applying such well-worn approaches to health and other issues arises from 
the propensity of members of risk societies to treat risks as if they exist materially 
and independently of observers. In this way, citizens living in risk-oriented cultures 
project  categorisations, values, uncertain expectations and time-frames onto unique 
occurrences. The differentiation and homogenisation of selected risk factor and 
outcome categories into reified ‘virtual objects’ (Van Loon, 2002) is a prerequisite for 
achieving organised coherence in risk-focussed social spheres such as healthcare. 
This stricture can be applied equally to clinical understandings of the complex health 
issues discussed in Health, Risk & Society and to service ‘tools’ such as risk-based 
hospital management and risk registers. But the treatment of constructed risk objects 
as substantive material entities must be achieved in the face of the inescapable 
epistemology of risk which requires observer judgements. Interpretive social science 
can, in principle at leastiv, act as an antithesis, providing ammunition for the many 
clinicians, service-users and members of the public who challenge prevailing 
operational over-simplifications. 
 
Objections to this positive spin on the value of critical risk social science can be 
raised in relation to its intellectual integrity and its relevance to both the situations of 
developed societies coming to terms with the financial crash of 2007 and the longer-
term crisis facing the prevailing global political economy. Adequate analysis of these 
issues goes well beyond the scope of an editorial or the present writer’s 
competence, but I will sketch out a few ideas. With respect to the validity of 
qualitative social science in general, it is often pointed out that the accumulation of 
knowledge depends upon researchers interpreting social actors’ meaningful actions 
and reconstructed accounts, most commonly the latter. Those of us who undertake 
studies focussed on the experience of health issues have a tendency to turn our 
attention away from our own role in actively constructing knowledge. This concern 
can be responded to in a number of ways. One influential analysis (Hall and Callery, 
2001) calls for greater reflectivity from researchers who attempt to operate within a 
quasi-inductive, modified grounded theory framework. More pessimistically, from a 
relativistic postmodern critique, it can be argued that researchers merely construct or 
co-construct accounts of accounts which become a phenomenon to be explained by 
further accounts, ad infinitum.  
 
I believe that I and many other practising researchers tend to block out such doubts. 
This blind-spot, ironically, matches the limitations of operational risk-thinking outlined 
above. However, counter-arguments to postmodernist pessimism can be put 
forward. Firstly, and perhaps lamely, qualitative researchers may feel intuitively that 
their research does reflect, however imperfectly, the perspectives of their participants 
independently of themselves. At the least, some of the raw data, admittedly filtered 
by researcher selection and manufactured through an interactional research 
process, is displayed for the reader to judge. In contrast, quantitative methodologies 
conceal such interpretive processes, as in, for instance, the judgements required for 
content analysis. Good qualitative researchers go to great lengths to see if they can 
disconfirm their own presuppositions, in part because ‘anomalies’ add to the richness 
of the findings, and, for the same reason, look out for unanticipated ‘surprises’. 
Perhaps most importantly, as argued by Green (2009), researchers can challenge a 
creeping meta-narrative in terms of which researchers become desensitised to 
alternative framings such as the ‘lens of enjoyment’ through viewing every issue 
through the ‘lens of risk’. A useful methodological stricture for qualitative risk 
researchers is to avoid, minimise or delay mentioning ‘risk’ in their interview topic 
guides. 
 
Larger external challenges to the prevailing paradigm of qualitative health risk 
research can be identified with respect to both the current crisis in developed 
societies and the future of the global political economy. Some governments, most 
particularly that of the UK, have responded to the financial crash of 2007 by partly 
dismantling health and welfare systems which are being drastically slimmed down, 
fragmented and privatised at the same time as wages are being squeezed. It is not 
easy to disentangle the drivers of pecuniary necessity from that of ‘self-hating’ 
government opposition to the state fuelled by the ideology of neoliberalism. A 
consequence of this transformation is that services which researchers critiqued in 
happier times for insensitivity simply cease to exist, become so reduced in scope, or 
become so commercialised that grumblings about their orientation start to seem like 
niceties. The current paradigm of health care research depends upon the operation 
of a wider social democratic consensus which, for better or worse, is under severe if 
not fatal attack.  
 
For example, research into the support needs of UK young carers (Heyman and 
Heyman, 2013) suggested that services for family members with disabilities needed 
to be better integrated with those directed at young carers. The fieldwork was carried 
out by Anna Heyman in the first decade of the present century before the 
subsequent shrinkage of these services had got underway. Such losses arguably 
make otiose previous debates about how they might be better fine-tuned. An obvious 
and justified rejoinder is that cost-effectiveness becomes more important than ever 
when resources get scarcer, and that micro research into service-user perspectives 
can contribute towards ensuring that public funding is used as wisely as possible. 
Nevertheless, as argued by Taylor-Gooby (Heyman and Brown, 2013b), a focus 
confined solely to tinkering with the details, however important, of service delivery 
can cause researchers to become blind to bigger paradigm changes in the political 
economy which are thereby allowed to pass unchallenged. His critique calls not for 
the abandonment of service-oriented research, but for a complementary strand of 
risk research which addresses the larger political economy. 
 
Finally, on an even bigger scale, risk social science needs to address the future of 
the now global socio-economic system. Pessimists, including the present author, 
identify a set of mega-risks which feeble international governance, overwhelmed by 
national self-interest and the power of multinational private companies, is 
spectacularly failing to address. These risks include human-induced runaway climate 
change, vital resource depletion, pollution, loss of antibiotic resistance, and 
unintended consequences of system complexification (Japp and Kusche, 2008) as 
illustrated by the financial crash. It is possible to visualise a crisis arising from just 
one of these risks occurring on so large a scalev that it overwhelms protective 
systems, as might happen if a solar storm of the intensity expected at least once per 
century destroys national electricity grids (Odenwald and Green, 2008); or 
destruction of the social order arising from two or more crises occurring 
simultaneously, fuelling each other. The work of Beck which first brought him to 
prominence has been diluted by social scientific debates, appropriate within their 
limits, about the extent to which the public do frame their lives in terms of risk 
consciousness (Tulloch and Lupton, 2003). Beck previously envisaged (1992, 
quoted author’s emphasis) that ‘in its mere continuity industrial society exits the 
stage of world history on the tip-toes of normality via the back stairs of side 
effects’.   
 
References 
 
Austin, L. C., Reventlow, S., Sandøe, P., & Brodersen, J. (2013). The structure of 
medical decisions: uncertainty, probability and risk in five common choice situations. 
Health, Risk & Society, 15(1), 27-50. 
Barton-Breck, A., & Heyman, B. (2012). Accentuate the positive, eliminate the 
negative? The variable value dynamics of non-suicidal self-hurting. Health, Risk & 
Society, 14(5), 445-464. 
Blumer, H. (1969) Symbolic Interactionism:  perspective and method. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Beck U. (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage. 
Brown P. (2013) Risk and Social Theory – a new venture and some new avenues. 
Health, Risk & Society, pp xxx-xxx.  
Brown, P., & de Graaf, S. (2013). Considering a future which may not exist: the 
construction of time and expectations amidst advanced-stage cancer. Health, Risk & 
Society, 15(6-7), 543-560. 
Burton-Jeangros, C., Cavalli, S., Gouilhers, S., & Hammer, R. (2013). Between 
tolerable uncertainty and unacceptable risks: how health professionals and pregnant 
women think about the probabilities generated by prenatal screening. Health, Risk & 
Society, 15(2), 144-161. 
Caiata-Zufferey, M. (2012). From danger to risk: Categorising and valuing 
recreational heroin and cocaine use. Health, Risk & Society, 14(5), 427-443. 
Clarke, J. N. (2011). Magazine portrayal of attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder 
(ADD/ADHD): A post-modern epidemic in a post-trust society. Health, Risk & 
Society, 13(7-8), 621-636. 
Coffey, M. (2012). A risk worth taking? Value differences and alternative risk 
constructions in accounts given by patients and their community workers following 
conditional discharge from forensic mental health services. Health, Risk & Society, 
14(5), 465-482. 
De Graaff, M. B., & Bröer, C. (2012). ‘We are the canary in a coal mine’: Establishing 
a disease category and a new health risk. Health, Risk & Society, 14(2), 129-147. 
Desmond, N., Prost, A., & Wight, D. (2012). Managing risk through treatment-
seeking in rural north-western Tanzania: Categorising health problems as malaria 
and nzoka. Health, Risk & Society, 14(2), 149-170. 
Foster, J., & Heyman, B. (2013). Drinking alcohol at home and in public places and 
the time framing of risks. Health, Risk & Society, 15(6-7), 511-524. 
Green, J. (2009). Is it time for the sociology of health to abandon ‘risk’?. Health, Risk 
& Society, 11(6), 493-508. 
Hall, W. A., & Callery, P. (2001). Enhancing the rigor of grounded theory: 
Incorporating reflexivity and relationality. Qualitative Health Research, 11(2), 257-
272. 
Heyman, A., & Heyman, B. (2013). ‘The sooner you can change their life course the 
better’: the time-framing of risks in relationship to being a young carer. Health, Risk & 
Society, 15(6-7), 561-579. 
Heyman, B., & Brown, P. (2012). Perspectives on the ‘lens of risk’ interview series: 
Interview with Nick Pidgeon. Health, Risk & Society, 14(2), 117-127. 
Heyman, B., & Brown, P. (2013a). Perspectives on the ‘lens of risk’ interview series: 
Interviews with Judith Green and Peter Taylor-Gooby. Health, Risk & Society, 15(1), 
12-26. 
Heyman, B., & Brown, P. (2013b). Perspectives on ‘the lens of risk’ interview series: 
interviews with Tom Horlick-Jones, Paul Slovic and Andy Alaszewski. Health, Risk & 
Society, 15(6-7), 494-510. 
Heyman, B., Godin, P. M., Reynolds, L., & Davies, J. P. (2013). Assessing the 
probability of patients reoffending after discharge from low to medium secure 
forensic mental health services: An inductive prevention paradox. Health, Risk & 
Society, 15(1), 84-102. 
Heyman, B., McGrath, A., Nastro, P., Lunniss, T. R., & Davies, J. P. (2012). The 
case of the lady who risked exploding: A study of multiple consequences and 
contested values. Health, Risk & Society, 14(5), 483-501. 
Heyman B., Shaw M., Alaszewski A. and Titterton M. (2010) Risk, Safety and 
Clinical Practice: Health Care Through the Lens of Risk. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Hoggart, L. (2012). ‘I’m pregnant… what am I going to do?’ An examination of value 
judgements and moral frameworks in teenage pregnancy decision making. Health, 
Risk & Society, 14(6), 533-549. 
Japp K.P. and Kusche I. (2008) Systems theory and risk. In J.O. Zinn (Ed.) Social 
Theories of Risk and Uncertainty. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Kayali, T., & Iqbal, F. (2012). Making Sense of Melancholy: Sub-Categorisation and 
the perceived risk of future depression. Health, Risk & Society, 14(2), 171-189. 
Kearney, J. (2013). Perceptions of non-accidental child deaths as preventable 
events: the impact of probability heuristics and biases on child protection work. 
Health, Risk & Society, 15(1), 51-66. 
Locke, A., & Budds, K. (2013). ‘We thought if it’s going to take two years then we 
need to start that now’: age, infertility risk and the timing of pregnancy in older first-
time mothers. Health, Risk & Society, 15(6-7), 525-542. 
Mead, M. (1934) Mind, Self and Society.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Odenwald, S. F., & Green, J. L. (2008). Bracing for a solor superstorm. Scientific 
American, 299(2), 80-87. 
Osimani, B. (2013). The precautionary principle in the pharmaceutical domain: a 
philosophical enquiry into probabilistic reasoning and risk aversion. Health, Risk & 
Society, 15(2), 123-143. 
Scamell, M., & Alaszewski, A. (2012). Fateful moments and the categorisation of 
risk: Midwifery practice and the ever-narrowing window of normality during childbirth. 
Health, Risk & Society, 14(2), 207-221. 
Skolbekken, J. A., Østerlie, W., & Forsmo, S. (2012). Risk categorisation through 
standard deviations–the challenge of bone density measurements: A focus group 
study among women attending the Nord-Trøndelag Health Study (HUNT). Health, 
Risk & Society, 14(2), 191-206. 
Stanley, T. (2013). ‘Our tariff will rise’: Risk, probabilities and child protection. Health, 
Risk & Society, 15(1), 67-83. 
The Royal Society (1992) Risk: Analysis, Perception and Management. Report of a 
Royal Society Study Group. London: The Royal Society. 
Topping, A., Nkosana-Nyawata, I., & Heyman, B. (2013). ‘I am not someone who 
gets skin cancer’: Risk, time and malignant melanoma. Health, Risk & Society, 15(6-
7), 596-614. 
Tulloch J. and Lupton G. (2003). Risk and Everyday Life. London: Sage. 
Van Loon J. (2002) Risk and Technological Culture: Towards a Sociology of 
Virulence. London: Routledge. 
West, E., Newton, V. L., & Barton-Breck, A. (2013). Time frames and self-hurting: 
that was then, this is now. Health, Risk & Society, 15(6-7), 580-595. 
Young, M.E., King, N., Harper, S., & Humphreys, K.R. (2013). The influence of 
popular media on perceptions of personal and population risk in possible disease 
outbreaks. Health, Risk & Society, 15 (1), 103–114. 
Zinn J.O. (Ed.)(2008) Social Theories of Risk and Uncertainty. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
                                            
i
 As I am retiring in March 2014, I have thrown academic caution to the wind in the final section. 
ii
 A common feature which emerged from these interviews was accounts of reinvention as a risk social 
scientist after stumbling into it fairly inadvertently from other areas. For example, Alaszewski became 
interested in risk through talking to vulnerable adults with learning disabilities living in institutions; and 
Horlick-Jones’ work originated from his role as a policy adviser on disaster planning for the Greater 
London Council which earned him the press epithet of ‘Mr Disaster’. My own interest was triggered in 
the late 1980s when I heard adults with moderate learning disabilities and their family carers talking in 
terms which could readily be translated into the language of risk. When I looked for a quick fix on this 
topic in psychology and sociology texts, I found that it wasn’t even mentioned in the indexes at that 
time. The current generation of younger academics can draw upon a vast, even overblown, published 
literature and are generating more refined, second-generation theoretical analyses (Zinn, 2008; 
Brown, 2013).  
iii
 One interesting paper concerned with the prevalence of narratives blaming women for HIV in a 
developing country marked by substantial gender inequality unfortunately didn’t quite make it into 
print. 
iv
 At the time of writing, in November 2013, many researchers employed by UK universities will have 
recently participated in the just-completed Research Excellence Framework (REF) quinquennial 
research evaluation. The 2014 exercise required evidence of non-academic impact. Those who 
undertake critical research have learnt how difficult it is to demonstrate within this simple, arguably 
simplistic, framework that their work actually makes a difference.  
v
 In recent times, the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan and the 2013 Hurricane Haiyan in 
the Philippines with the highest ever recorded wind speed provide examples of mid-scale 
catastrophes that national and international systems can just about cope with. Others, equally 
serious, such as the spread of the Sahara receive much less media attention because they unfold 
more slowly. 
